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Experience, Reflect, Critique: The End of the ‘Learning Cycles’ Era 
Abstract 
According to prevailing models, experiential learning is by definition a stepwise process 
beginning with direct experience, followed by reflection, followed by learning. It has been 
argued, however, that stepwise models inadequately explain the holistic learning processes that 
are central to learning from experience, and that they lack scientific or philosophical foundations. 
Criticism also centers on the way complex cultural, social, and physical processes during 
experience and learning are reduced to a rational, excessively cognitive, individual phenomenon. 
This article reviews this criticism and adds a historical dimension to the analysis, concluding that 
existing cyclic models might be better valued for their important historical contribution, rather 
than as active theories of learning in experiential education. 
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Experience, Reflect, Critique: The End of the ‘Learning Cycles’ Era 
 
Advocates of outdoor and adventure education would undoubtedly consider their 
approaches to be robust arenas for experiential learning. For nearly three decades, however, 
researchers and practitioners have recognized a gap between the transformational learning often 
witnessed during experiential programs, and the ability of the most common conceptual models 
and research methods to explain these transformations (e.g., Kraft, 1990; Wichmann, 1980). This 
has come to be known as the “black box” phenomenon (Baldwin, Persing, & Magnuson, 2004). 
On the one hand, the persistence of this gap supports the view that experiential learning may 
simply be “too mysterious a phenomenon to fully comprehend” (Conrad & Hedin, 1981, p. 6). 
On the other hand, it is possible that this gap in knowledge can be attributed to the fundamental 
way learning has been conceived within these fields. 
Experiential learning is typically described within outdoor and adventure education “as a 
sequential process consisting of several different components, and learning occurs once one has 
completed the entire sequence” (Wurdinger & Paxton, 2003, p. 41). Yet the idea that experiential 
learning is by definition a cycle made up of orderly, sequenced steps is neither eternal nor 
universally shared. This idea has in fact received considerable criticism in the broader education 
literature, so much so that the editors of Adult Education Quarterly recently declared it a 
hindrance to future scholarship. Observing changes in knowledge, research methods, and 
historical circumstances, they urged readers to “not be caught up short in our thinking and action 
with unquestioned traditions living on in our work” (Wilson & Hayes, 2002, p. 175). However, 
the full weight of this criticism has not been acknowledged in the outdoor and adventure 
education literature. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case; so central is this conception of 




learning that it underwrites the “first principle” of experiential education: “Experiential learning 
occurs when carefully chosen experiences are supported by reflection, critical analysis and 
synthesis” (AEE, n.d.). Given the enduring influence stepwise models have on research and 
practice in experiential education – even beyond outdoor and adventure education – and given 
the extent of the criticism they have received elsewhere, it may be prudent to revisit the way 
learning is unconditionally (albeit often tacitly) defined as a “cycle” or “sequence.” 
This article reviews the existing criticisms of “learning cycles” and adds a historical 
dimension to the analysis. Historical analysis creates a useful way to assess an idea’s strengths 
and limitations. It does this by showing how ideas arise out of specific historical conditions and 
are aimed at solving particular problems, and how they often reflect the values, perspectives, and 
goals of people working to promote them. Historical analysis also raises the possibility that 
circumstances and purposes may be different today than before, and that continually relying on 
inherited assumptions in an uncritical way may shortchange the way educators think about, 
study, and support learning in outdoor and adventure programs. 
While the concept of learning cycles has played a valuable formative role in experiential 
education to this point, its original purposes and its limits should be observed more carefully 
when basing research and program designs on it in the future. This is a matter of some urgency 
given today’s “evidence-based” climate (Gass, 2005) and as changing societal demographics and 
more elaborate program goals require innovations in practice and research. The article closes by 
noting several ways outdoor and adventure educators in particular can move beyond current 
conceptual and practical limits. 
A History of Ideas 
With regards to outdoor and adventure education, commentary on the mechanics of 




experiential learning is said to begin with Plato (Wurdinger, 1995). Modern understanding of 
experiential learning, however, derives from more recent influences such as John Dewey’s 
experimental method, Piaget’s constructivism, and Kurt Hahn’s humanism, along with some 
combination of behaviorist and cognitive psychology (Hunt, 1990; Kraft, 1990). These 
underpinnings were formalized as models in the mid-20
th
 century, when “experiential learning” 
piqued institutional interest. The prototypical – and most influential (Vince, 1998) – model is 
Kolb’s (1984) Experiential Learning Cycle (Figure 1). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
The ideas and models from this era have been characterized as “constructivist 
perspectives of experiential learning” (Fenwick, 2001). Labeling these models a perspective 
suggests the possibility of alternatives, and helps mark them off from more established 
disciplinary traditions. The models comprising this perspective, Fenwick observes, share the 
assumption “that learning happens through cognitive reflection, experience can be considered 
like a bounded object, and an individual ‘learner’ can be separated from his or her experience to 
process knowledge from that experience” (pp. 7-8). It is helpful to highlight these assumptions 
upfront to position them as historical artifacts rather than as taken-for-granted truths.  
Historical context, theoretical purposes, and ideological commitments.  The 
constructivist perspective of experiential learning developed into a unified set of ideas, if not an 
ideological movement, in the 1960s and 1970s amidst changing educational and social trends 
(Keeton, 1976). The models developed during this period served two purposes. The first purpose 
was predominantly administrative. They were explicitly intended to help colleges devise criteria 
for awarding credit to adults on the basis of prior life experience, as well as to meet the needs of 
practitioners using simulation games, role plays, and encounter groups as instructional methods 




(Chickering, 1977; Pearson & Smith, 1985). The second purpose was moral and social. The 
movement’s pioneers lamented “the dizzying rate of change” characterizing modern society 
(Kolb, 1984, p. 3) and nostalgically sought to reconnect adults with practical life experience 
while also empowering them to make positive changes in their lives. They unapologetically 
infused humanistic values into their conception of learning in order to promote “the development 
of individuals to their full potential as citizens, family members, and human beings” (Kolb, p. 4).   
These purposes are also somewhat conflicting, however. On the one hand, proponents of 
the constructivist perspective of experiential learning cultivated an educational vision in which 
“the learner is directly in touch with the realities being studied” (Keeton, in Kolb, 1984, p. 5). In 
a “hope-filled” manner, they celebrated their commitments to “existential values of personal 
involvement, and responsibility and humanistic values … a spirit of inquiry, expanded 
consciousness and choice, and authenticity in relationships” (Kolb, p. 11).  
On the other hand, the legitimacy of experiential learning hinged on the ability to 
convince educational institutions that adults’ lifelong “learning can be reliably assessed and 
certified for college credit” (Kolb, 1984, p. 3). The Commission on Non-Traditional Study was 
formed in 1971 to address this issue, resulting in the Cooperative Assessment of Experiential 
Learning (CAEL). CAEL gathered renowned scholars as well as corporate interests such as the 
Educational Testing Service to survey the status of experiential learning both as an instructional 
approach and as a general, existential phenomenon that could be assessed and certified (Keeton, 
1976). Their task framed by these two purposes, advocates needed to reconcile adults’ ability to 
learn on their own with the institutional demand for order and predictability. Problematically, 
interest in experiential learning outpaced the research available to support it on both counts. One 
contributor to CAEL, sociologist James Coleman (1976), provocatively suggested that learning 




in everyday situations should be valued alongside school learning, yet he noted that his brief 
comments were “far from definitive … intended primarily to raise issues for serious examination 
rather than to provide conclusive prescriptions. The investigation of these matters has a long way 
to go” (p. 58).  
Nearly ten years later, however, Boud, Keough and Walker (1985) still found that the 
available “learning theory, despite some hopeful signs, has yet to make any substantial 
contributions to the kinds of learning tasks with which we are normally faced” and they lamented 
that “many of our remarks cannot be underpinned by the kinds of research we would hope for” 
(p. 38). The urgent need under these conditions was to develop a conception of experiential 
learning predictable enough to incorporate “experience” into pre-established categories, yet 
open-ended enough to convey the humanistic aims of its advocates. The claim that adult learners 
should “be able to involve themselves fully, openly, and without bias in new experiences” (Kolb, 
1984, p. 30) was balanced against the need to demonstrate how “experience” could be 
institutionally organized, assessed, and certified. The apparent contradiction entailed in this 
project was either minimized or disregarded. The tension between these two purposes would 
ultimately be relieved by adopting a narrow conception of experience, and by supplying a 
cognitive mechanism that could satisfy the condition of self-determination while also providing 
evidence of creditable knowledge. 
Experiential learning in two parts.  Experiential learning took shape not as the research 
program Coleman called for, but as “both a philosophy and a technique, usually focusing on the 
relationships between an individual, his or her reflective processes, and something called 
concrete experience” (Fenwick, 2001, p. 8). As Fenwick notes, the emerging conception of 
experiential learning contained two major aspects. The first was the “here-and-now concrete 




experience” (Kolb, 1984, p. 21). Experience in this sense refers to a time-bounded episode of 
small group interaction, an instructional technique drawn from T-group training methods that 
would figure centrally in their conceptual models (Kolb, 1984). The second aspect, individual 
reflection, was attributed to Lewin, to Dewey, and to Paolo Freire, whose critical views were 
positioned as the “revolutionary extension of the liberal, humanist perspective” (Kolb, p. 16). 
The principal aim behind reflection was to accomplish “analytic detachment” (Kolb, p. 9) and 
“regain our flexibility and creativity in responding to the current situation” (Boud et al., 1985, p. 
29).  
At first glance, the emancipatory ideals of reflection – something individual adult 
learners could do “with or without the aid of others” (Boud et al., 1985, p. 26) – seem 
compelling. Reflection ostensibly provides a means for self-creation in knowledge; finally 
learners would “have the freedom to make a genuine choice for themselves, rather than conform 
to the influence of a teacher or other students” (p. 14). But, in keeping with the pressing 
administrative need to assess and certify adults’ experience, reflection also needed to conform to 
the institutions that would approve and sanction knowledge (Michelson, 1999). For these 
reasons, reflection could not always be left up to the learner. Boud et al. admit that “there are 
limits to what each of us can achieve unaided and often the learning process can be considerably 
accelerated by appropriate support, encouragement, and intervention by others” (p. 36). In order 
to lay the groundwork for their own proposal, they were, of course, forced to concede “that it is 
useful for learners and teachers to have a model of reflection which points to some of the major 
processes which they should consider” (p. 26). The directiveness of what learners “should” 
consider, the emphasis on “accelerating” the learning process, and the “intervention” of an 
instructor were apparently not seen as incongruous with the overriding desire for autonomy in 




knowing, captured most clearly in the following passage: 
Because we can still learn from our own experience, because we can subject the abstract 
symbols of the social-knowledge system to the rigors of our own inquiry about these 
symbols and our own personal experience with them, we are free. This process of 
choosing to believe is what we feel when we know that we are free to chart the course of 
our own destiny. (Kolb, 1984, p. 109) 
The ambiguity inherent in this perspective may be its greatest asset; a conceptual model 
such as Kolb’s four-stage cycle has tremendous intuitive appeal, adapts handily to various 
practical applications (e.g., Enns, 1993), and supports a humanistic faith in self-direction. The 
assumptions behind this perspective, however, derive more from the prevailing ideological and 
institutional context of adult education in the 1970s than from focused programs of inquiry about 
the connections between experience and reflection in learning. The selective use of 
“theoreticians with quite different backgrounds, motives and incompatible conceptions … as 
founders and ‘supporters’ of experiential learning” (Miettinen, 2000, p. 56) allowed early 
advocates to conflate two opposing ideas: their commitment to the radically autonomous learner, 
and collectivist and institutional visions for educational “experiences.”  This ambivalence 
remains largely unaddressed in current scholarship and may help explain the persistence of the 
black box phenomenon. 
The constructivist perspective of experiential learning is thus revealed not as a rigorous 
theory of social and mental processes, but as a set of ideas selected from various disciplinary 
traditions and training regimens in the attempt to “construct an attractive collection of ideas that 
can be advocated as a solution to the social problems of our time …” (Miettinen, 2000, p. 56); 
which, at the time of its founding, were the administrative needs of higher education institutions 




and the ideological interests of the human potential movement (Chickering, 1977). 
Furthermore, although these influential authors noted that their claims were not supported by 
research, their work is often cited as foundational without reference to historical context, 
ideological background, or theoretical purpose (e.g., Wurdinger & Priest, 1999). Today, this 
framework has evolved from a set of practice-driven models with historically specific purposes 
into a broader belief system underwritten more by liberal-humanist ideology, folk psychology, 
and administrative interests than by a scientific or epistemological foundation for learning. It has 
also received considerable criticism in various disciplines such as education, psychology, and 
philosophy. 
Criticism against the Constructivist Perspective of Experiential Learning 
Many of the principles inherent in the constructivist perspective of experiential learning 
have already received considerable criticism in the outdoor and adventure education literature. 
Critics in the adult and management education literature – the traditions from which many of 
these models originated – have focused on more severe methodological and epistemological 
problems. These challenges will now be reviewed. 
Challenges from within outdoor and adventure education.  Loynes (2002) argues that the 
kind of rational, “algorithmic paradigm” sponsored by constructivist models is so pervasive that 
the field’s language, practices, and values largely derive from it, to the exclusion of other 
alternatives. Bell (1993) observed that many characterizations of experiential education seem 
preoccupied with individual change and lack “clear sociological analysis” even though the 
importance of “group identity or culture” (p. 19) is often discussed with respect to participants’ 
learning. Quay (2003) argued that “mechanistic” stepwise models fail to capture the “holistic 
nature” of experiential learning (p. 108). Similarly, Hovelynck (2001) found outdoor leaders 




developing “practice theories” that better reflect their work once in the field, suggesting that 
stepwise models may actually inform practice only superficially. Despite these criticisms, the 
description of experiential learning as “the change in an individual that results from reflection on 
a direct experience and results in new abstractions and applications” (Itin, 1999, p. 93) remains 
remarkably durable as a basic concept within outdoor and adventure education, if not all 
experiential education. These criticisms, however, suggest that this conception of learning cannot 
meaningfully elaborate the connection between individual and social or physical elements: a 
connection on which many central claims about outdoor and adventure education depend. 
Methodological challenges.  One methodological criticism is that early models such as 
Kolb’s (1984) took theorists’ ideas out of context and misapplied them to experiencing and 
learning, thereby narrowing “experience” to fit preconceived institutional categories and 
instructional methods. According to Miettinen (2000), this tendency resulted in the conceptual 
“impoverishment” of “the rich variety and modes of human experience characteristic of various 
human activities” (p. 61). Today, using the concept of “learning cycles” as both a definition of 
learning and a template for practice enforces a kind of internally reinforcing logic. Althusser’s 
(1964) critique of liberalism is apt here: “while it really does designate a set of existing relations, 
unlike a scientific concept, it does not provide us with a means of knowing them” (p. 3). 
Management educators Holman, Pavlica and Thorpe (1997) note the practical dangers with this 
logic. Speaking of Kolb, they observe: 
Such has been his influence, that it appears that when managers 'fail to learn' they are 
thought by educators to have failed to grasp certain aspects of the learning process (i.e. 
the learning cycle), but few question experiential learning theory itself or search for 
alternative explanations. (p. 138. See also Wallace, 1996) 




Finally, Kolb’s description of learning styles, a core concept on which his model is 
based, has been questioned by different authors. Miettinen (2000) argues that Kolb does not 
effectively show how the “four different kinds of abilities – concrete experience abilities (CE), 
reflective observation abilities (RO), abstract conceptualizing abilities (AC) and active 
experimentation abilities (AE)” (Kolb, in Miettinen, p. 61, italics in original) – are related to one 
another or correspond with phases in a cycle. Miettinen concludes that Kolb’s Learning Styles 
Inventory is simply a training tool and should not be considered a typology of underlying 
learning mechanisms. Research in cognitive science supports Miettinen’s critique; Kirschner, 
Schweller and Clark (2006) summarize studies showing “that there is little or no correlation 
between factors that should correlate with the classification of learning styles, and that it [the 
Learning Styles Inventory] does not enjoy a general acceptance of its usefulness, particularly for 
research purposes” (p. 81).  
Epistemological challenges.  There are also epistemological problems with experience 
and reflection. With regards to experience, Holman et al. (1997) explain how the central concept 
of direct experience in constructivist models 
is seen as pure, unproblematic, fully accessible by conscious thought, possessing a 
presymbolic quality which exists prior to the meaning attached to it. The text of 
experience will always be able to be read. Its meaning will always be apparent and 
decipherable. (p. 138) 
Miettinen (2000) critiques this perspective as naïve, noting “the theoretical and epistemological 
inadequacy of the concept of immediate personal experience” (p. 61) and arguing that there is no 
such thing as direct experience independent from theories or symbols in the first place. Emerging 
empirical research in the outdoor and adventure education fields supports this criticism, 




illustrating how experiencing and learning processes are mediated by the physical, social, and 
discursive conditions of experience (Brown, 2004; Seaman, 2007). 
As the radically autonomous learner and the simple “directness” of experience are called 
into question, reflection as the central act of knowledge production in experiential programs is 
destabilized and the chronology of “experience-reflect-learn” is not easily maintained as a basic 
principle of learning. Controversially, evidence suggests that conscious reflection may not play 
as basic a role in experiential learning as previously believed; research in “social practice” 
traditions shows how people learn in experience, not from or after it (e.g., Cole, Engeström, & 
Vasquez, 1997; Engeström, Mietinnen, & Punamaki, 2003). These findings, which are far too 
numerous to list here, make the sentiment “experience alone is not the key to learning” (Boud et 
al., 1985, p. 7) simply seem strange, if not misguided.  
Furthermore, Michelson (1996) suggests that even if reflection could be conceived as 
merely a mental exercise, one cannot escape social and cultural meanings when one does it 
(imagine trying to reflect without using language). The rational emphasis in reflection may itself 
be culturally influenced; for instance, Boud et al. (1985) repeatedly stress that “removing 
obstructing feelings is a necessary precursor to a rational consideration of events” (p. 26). The 
presence of obstructing emotions, they write, can “override our rationality to such an extent that 
we react unawarely and with blurred perceptions” (p. 28). The view that “negative” emotions are 
to be seen as suspect rather than as crucial insights into the world is a key factor in the argument 
that experiential learning, as we now know it, is gendered (Fullagar & Hailstone, 1996; 
Michelson, 1996). Moreover, such a position is inherently distrustful of bodily experience, an 
ironic situation for a practice that places a premium on physical interaction and engagement with 
the natural world.  




Sociocultural challenges.  The constructivist perspective of experiential learning is 
closely linked to Western ideals of individual development. Most notably, Kolb (1984) describes 
experiential learning as a process of facilitating “growth” and “progress” toward “the highest 
stages of development” (p. 140), a progression in which learners move “from a state of 
embeddedness, defensiveness, dependence, and reaction to a state of self-actualization, 
independence, proaction and self-direction” (p. 140). He takes as his developmental chronology 
the “ordering of ages at which developmental achievements become possible in the general 
conditions of contemporary Western culture” (p. 141). This framework, if acknowledged 
explicitly, could prove instructive to research and program design (cf. Beach, 1999). However, if 
unrecognized, and if used uncritically as the basic premise for broad claims about experiencing 
and learning, opens the perspective to charges of ethnocentrism. 
From a cross-cultural standpoint, this view may encourage a deficit view of 
developmental differences pertaining to non-Western cultural traditions. Early research in 
cultural psychology has been criticized for this very reason, namely that particular forms of 
abstract reasoning – those common to highly literate societies of European descent – are 
positioned as a universally advanced developmental state: 
Almost all of the well-known “grand theories” of development have specified a single 
developmental trajectory, moving toward a pinnacle that resembles the values of the 
theorist’s own community or indeed of the theorist’s own life-course. For example, 
theorists who are extremely literate and have spent many years in school often regard 
literacy and Euro-American school ways of thinking and acting as central to the goals of 
successful development, and even as defining “higher” cultural evolution of whole 
societies. (Rogoff, 2003, p. 18) 




Research has shown that abstract knowing is not in fact decontextualized, but instead indicates 
cognitive functioning typical to persons who have participated extensively in institutionalized 
schooling and middle-class child rearing practices (Lave, 1993). Cloran (1999) illustrates how 
the specialized discourse pattern of observe-reflect-generalize in particular indicates extensive 
participation in these practices rather than a universal communicative or cognitive structure. 
Again, this recognition could prove helpful to research and program design, but its cultural 
assumptions should be made overt, rather than being kept hidden. 
From a social and political standpoint, the individualism inherent in the constructivist 
perspective may block efforts to understand mutuality and reciprocity in learning. Michelson 
(1999) argues: 
Underneath the avowal that community is indispensable is a longing for a unitary, 
authentic self untouched by the demands of human mutuality. … Experiential learning 
encourages psychic growth by freeing us from the oppression of other people’s choices. 
Knowles (1990: 42-43) quotes Carl Rogers to the effect that ‘I have yet to find the 
individual who, when he [sic] examines his situation deeply … deliberately chooses to 
have the integrated direction of himself undertaken by another’. (p. 140) 
This individualism may also hinder a deeper understanding of the creativity and spontaneity that 
arises in face-to-face interaction, as “subjectivities that are potentially multiple, shifting, 
transgressive, and spontaneous are recast as coherent, stable, rational, and self-regulating” 
(Fenwick, 2001, p. 32). From this view, it is difficult to see how individualistic models of 
learning can adequately support educational approaches strongly claiming “community” and 
“perspective taking” as desired outcomes (McKenzie, 2000; Wyatt, 1997).  
Finally, from an ecological perspective, Bowers (2005) argues that individualist 




constructivism, which embraces abstract visions of rational, Western progress, intends to 
“emancipate students from the traditional forms of knowledge that prevent them from entering 
the modern world” (p. IX); the world of consumerism. By doing so, it tacitly devalues 
longstanding cultural traditions as backwards and irrelevant. Similarly, it has been suggested that 
the constructivists’ preoccupation with the individual is strongly “tied to social relations of 
capitalism” and has overtones of discipline and external control (Michelson, in Fenwick, 2001, p. 
23). Taken together, these critiques add support to Bowers’ (2005) assertion that constructivist 
theories may unwittingly promote indoctrination by narrowing the broader concepts of 
experiencing and learning to fit within preconceived institutional, cultural, and moral 
frameworks without acknowledging their own function in doing so. In Bowers’ argument, the 
effect is an “illusory state of consciousness” ensuring that “both the teachers and students do not 
know what they do not know” (p. 110), a condition that is presently leading to cultural and 
environmental degradation. In outdoor and adventure education, Brookes (2002) has put the 
problem this way: “Realism and individualism are convenient; they exempt outdoor educators 
from having to know much about nature (it can be perceived directly) or culture (since meaning 
comes from within the individual rather than from collective memory)” (p. 415).  
Implications of these Critiques 
Kirschner et al. (2006) note that constructivism’s “emphasis on the practical application 
of what is being learned seems very positive” (p. 84), yet they encourage educators to move past 
“the fuzzy and unproductive world of ideology – which sometimes hides under the various 
banners of constructivism – to the sharp and productive world of theory-based research on how 
people learn” (p. 84). While it is highly doubtful that theory and research could ever be separated 
from ideology at any level, their assertion that constructivist models of experiential learning have 




historically been driven more by ideology than by research would appear to have merit.  
One implication of the foregoing historical analysis and critical review should be clear: 
researchers and practitioners might no longer unconditionally accept the definition of 
experiential learning as a sequence or a cycle. Making continued and unqualified use of this 
standard definition is problematic for several reasons. First, the most commonly used 
constructivist models, which have largely become axiomatic with respect to learning in 
experiential education, were developed under a set of historical circumstances primarily affecting 
adult education. The extent to which “experience-reflect-learn” patterns apply to experiential 
learning as it happens with children or as part of compulsory schooling has been taken more as 
an article of faith than as a proposition that is subject to verification. Researchers might prioritize 
this issue since it seems central to practice at a very basic level (Russell, 2006). Second, the 
tendency of constructivist models to dichotomize individual, social, and environmental aspects 
of learning remains largely unaddressed by researchers in outdoor and adventure education. This 
is especially problematic since social and physical conditions are believed to play a central role 
in individual and group learning (Walsh & Golins, 1976). Bereiter (2002) describes one problem 
with such individual approaches: 
Although cooperation and teamwork are praised, the idea of cooperating in the creation 
of knowledge never comes to life … it is hard to deal with the everyday fact of people 
jointly producing a piece of knowledge that is neither the product of one individual’s 
knowledge or the combination of several individuals’ knowledge. Such knowledge is 
typically an emergent of discourse and cannot be understood at the level of individual 
interacting minds. (pp. 177-178) 




In other words, constructivist models reduce the highly interactive and bodily qualities of 
outdoor and adventure experiences to secondary elements in an individual’s experience, rather 
than being constitutive of experience at a more fundamental level. 
Third, ample empirical research and philosophical argument (e.g., Fenwick, 2001; 
Rogoff, Paradise, Meija-Arauz, Correa-Chavez, & Angelillo, 2003) suggests that the definition 
of experiential learning as an orderly series of steps either (A) is false, because alternative links 
between experience and learning can easily be found that do not follow such a pattern and may 
not emphasize reflection at all, or (B) represents only a narrow type of experiential learning, and 
thus has limited range outside of specific situations. Therefore, other, more established 
disciplinary traditions may offer methodological and practical insights at a time when both 
research and practice face new pressures, and when the gap in our knowledge persists.  
Conclusion 
The intent of this article was not to suggest that the routine patterns used in different 
experiential practices – such as outdoor and adventure programs – in which participants engage 
in an activity then jointly or individually “reflect,” should be abandoned. This straightforward 
approach has unquestionably served many practitioners throughout the years. However, this 
article has presented several arguments against the claim that experiential learning can be 
fundamentally understood as equivalent to these patterns. Moreover, these arguments suggest 
that the pattern of “experience-reflect-learn” might be considered an ideology of experiential 
learning rather than a philosophy or a theory of experiential learning. In its time, this framework 
served a useful purpose. However, given changes in knowledge, research methods, participant 
populations, societal trends, and educational goals, it may now be influencing research and 
practice in unhelpful ways. 




One challenge now is to develop conceptions of experiential learning, and methods for 
studying it, that do not “limit our theorizing and threaten to repress both experiencing and 
learning processes” (Fenwick, 2001, p. 25). This will require adopting theoretical perspectives 
that take social and cultural context seriously (cf. Brookes, 2003), that hold promise for guiding 
instructional practice in increasingly complex applications, and that align with the standards of 
established scientific and philosophical traditions rather than being based in institutional lore and 
folk psychology. If experiential education is to play a serious part in the social, educational, and 
ecological problems of our time, it may be worth moving “alternative” perspectives to a more 
central role in future inquiry and scholarship.  
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Figure 1: Kolb experiential learning cycle (ELC) 
 
 
